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BEING CONSERVATIVE IN THE YEAR OF TRUMP

Will Republicans on Capitol Hill reclaim their
right—and responsibility—to legislate?

Conservatism’s
Constitutional Moment
Greg Weiner

T

he essential question confronting American conservatism is what,
precisely, it aspires to conserve. The ascension of Donald J. Trump not
just to the Oval Office but also to the leadership of America’s traditionally
conservative party compels a serious confrontation of that question. He is
not conservative in the senses in which the term has typically been understood. He is opposed to many dimensions of economic freedom, resists
entitlement reform, and seems at best unaware of notions of constitutional
limitation.
But what in the age of Trumpism—which
is, if nothing else, an age of upheaval—are
conservatives to conserve? The answer must
be the constitutional regime underlying policy
disputes that otherwise draw all emphasis into
their impetuous vortex. Policy disputes are
transient; the constitutional principles that
frame and shape them endure. By focusing on

constitutionalism, conservatives can emulate
the Framers’ tradition of conserving reform
that binds generations. Despite the common
belief that the American regime was cast in
the crucible of abstract philosophy, the Framers at Philadelphia in fact carefully adapted
long-standing colonial forms. James Madison
in particular grasped the idea of a constitution
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as an intergenerational compact through
which the dead could obligate the living.
By any conventional measure, the signs
for constitutionalism are inauspicious. A
single party controls all elective mechanisms
of government, and its appointees may soon
hold a working majority on the Supreme
Court as well. The president is a populist
interested in maintaining an unmediated
relationship with the public. Congressional
majorities have historically lain supine before
presidents of their own party. Yet as Geoffrey Vaughan, Daniel Stid, and others have
argued, one benefit of the Trump presidency
may be a congressional revival. There are
intriguing reasons to believe this is actually conservatism’s constitutional moment.
Single-party rule in which members of Congress are known to disagree substantively
with the president on major issues sets up a
unique constitutional experiment that will
test, without the obfuscating variable of partisan opposition, the Republican commitment to constitutional process. That is not
to say congressional Republicans will always
oppose the president, and still less that they
should seek reasons to. Where they agree,
collaboration is appropriate. Where Trump’s
policy agenda is vague, as Yuval Levin has
perceptively noted, they can inform it. But
even in cooperation, they can insist on a
leading role for Congress. In opposition,
they should especially do so.
This is not to say that all Republicans are
conservative, or that all conservatives are
Republican. Neither is the case. But conserving Democrats are increasingly rare. A preservation of conservatism as a philosophical
force depends on a Republican Party willing
to mount a moral defense of it. Republicans
have both an opportunity and a responsibility to demonstrate that their rhetorical
commitment to constitutionalism and not
merely to policy preferences or, worse, power
is meaningful. This is the clearest test in generations of the endurance of the Philadelphia
34
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regime against a creeping parliamentarism
under which party loyalties run roughshod
over institutional forms. Conservatives will
not deserve power if they fail it.

Giving the legislature its due
The separation of powers is the hinge of
this test. It is fitting that the concept itself
as received in the United States was not an
innovation of theoretical abstraction but
rather a product of political necessity: the
sharing of power between deeply rooted
social classes in the mother country, a
mechanism whose theoretical advantages
Montesquieu—the most quoted philosopher of the founding period, Donald Lutz
found—noticed and most fully developed.
The separation of powers, in turn, assumes
the legislature’s priority in setting policy.
Even by way of defending executive energy
in Federalist No. 70, Alexander Hamilton
specifies that the president should implement with speed precisely because the legislature has first decided with deliberation.
James Madison, later at war with Hamilton
over the extent of presidential authority in
the Pacificus-Helvidius debates, writes: “The
natural province of the executive magistrate
is to execute laws, as that of the legislature is
to make laws. All his acts therefore, properly
executive, must presuppose the existence of
the laws to be executed.”
To be sure, Federalist No. 73 praises the
president’s veto as “an additional security
against the enactment of improper laws. It
establishes a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the community against the effects of faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the
public good, which may happen to influence
a majority of that body.” The suggestion is
of a presidency that serves as an occasional
break on the impulses of the legislature. The
practice is now reversed. The contemporary

modernagejournal.com

Conservatism’s Constitutional Moment

So much for congressional supremacy

assumption is of a presidential regime the
Congress periodically checks.
It too rarely does even that much. Even in
explicit opposition, for example, a Republican
Congress did not answer President Obama’s
executive unilateralism on immigration with
legislative retaliation, for which its tools are
ample. Members asked the courts to retaliate for them. (A statement from Speaker
Paul Ryan’s office offered the breathless if
anticlimactic promise that “the House will
take an unprecedented step to stop President
Obama’s executive overreach. That’s right: In
the coming weeks, the House will vote on
filing an amicus brief.”) Congress was listless, other than oratorically, when Obama
used regulation to rewrite sections of the
Affordable Care Act and unapologetically
acknowledged that he was doing so because
Republicans controlled Congress.
It may, ironically, take a president of their
own party with whom Congress disagrees
on a variety of important issues to restore
the tension between branches that the separation of powers assumes. The first shot in
what could be this emergent battle was fired
a week after Election Day, when Trump
economic adviser Stephen Moore, late of

the Club for Growth and suddenly of the
school of protectionism, is reported to have
announced summarily to House Republican
whips that they now belonged to the party of
Donald Trump, not of Ronald Reagan. In a
report of the incident in The Hill, there is no
record of dissent, only of astonishment.
This may reflect lingering wonder at
Trump’s ascent, but an initial reply—more
on a constitutional one presently—might
have noted that House Republicans garnered
a three-million-vote majority in ballots cast
for Congress, as against Trump’s almost
three-million‒vote deficit in the popular
vote for president. Trump wields a superior
mandate only if it is measured in the incredulity gap that separated expectations from
results in his victory.
To be sure, that is not to say that the public concerns into which Trump tapped are
wholly to be dismissed on the grounds of a
free-market dogmatism ill-suited to the temperament and perhaps the economics of the
moment. But there is a difference between
what Walter Lippmann called a “directed”
and a “compensated” economy, the former of
which seeks to rearrange markets to political
purposes and the latter of which recognizes,
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and thus seeks to insure individuals against,
their shortcomings. As Lippmann noted, even
Franklin Roosevelt abandoned his aspirations
to direct the economy. Trump seems to harbor such aspirations once more. The middle
ground that congressional Republicans can
strike is a robust, if market-oriented, system
of social insurance that recognizes that there
is no better system of distributing goods and
services than markets, but they are not always
ideal means of meeting all material needs.
In any event, some disagreements persist,
and now both sides face a clarifying moment.
Do Republicans on Capitol Hill intend to
pay Trump deference on policy in those areas
where they disagree, or reclaim their right—
and responsibility—to legislate? The question
would be obscured if they agreed with him
across the board on policy, since they would
appear simply to be falling in line. But they do
not. Trump is a protectionist who thinks the
power of government is appropriately used to
dictate where goods are made, bought, and
sold. Indeed, one of his first achievements
as president-elect was to pressure a private
company to locate manufacturing jobs where
he felt they should be rather than where the
diffuse preferences of buyers and sellers in
the market dictated. Congressional conservatives, by contrast, have long campaigned on
a philosophical commitment to open trade
that is rooted politically—economic liberty
is a bulwark against political tyranny, in no
small part because a government empowered
to limit commercial freedom has the capacity
to limit other kinds too—as well as economically. Trump’s voters depend on affordable
imported goods, and what wages they stand
to gain from the manufacturing jobs he
alleges he has the power to restore would not
begin to offset the inflation they would face
from the trade wars he certainly has the ability to spark.
There are indications of other disagreements. It is difficult to see how the party
that opposed the Obama stimulus can
36
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endorse Trump’s $1 trillion infrastructure
plan dictated not by actual needs for major
projects but rather by Keynesian economics.
An assumption that the market cannot build
the Hoover Dam is one thing. It is entirely
another to say that economic growth is best
served by extracting funds from the economy
through taxation and public borrowing, then
pooling them for centralized political redirection. On Trump’s signature issue of immigration, meanwhile, conservatism is committed to national sovereignty and thus rejects
the idea that to preserve borders is inherently
chauvinistic. Still, there are ample prudential
and philosophical reasons to oppose a border
wall and massive deportations. This opposition is already long recorded among at least
some Republicans on Capitol Hill.
Of course, elections realign beliefs. They
are supposed to. Moreover, presidents have
inherent rhetorical advantages in the promotion of policy. It would be little surprise
if some congressional Republicans came
around to Trumpism. Something would be
amiss if none did. Nor is there any call for
gratuitous opposition where conservatives
can more constructively inform Trump’s
agenda than oppose it. Regardless, the conditions are ripe for deep differences of opinion between the White House and Capitol
Hill on at least some issues.
Since the differences are not obscured by
partisan disputes, it is likelier that their terms
can be understood to be constitutional. Had
Trump faced a Democratic Congress, or
a President Clinton a Republican one, the
constitutional differences would have been
impossible to see for the partisan ones. The
situation of single-party control, however,
accentuates the constitutional dynamics.
Even if congressional Republicans stand up
for Congress’s authority solely for the sake
of preserving their power to pursue policies
in which they believe, rather than high constitutional principle, they will be operating
on the motive of ambition that Madison
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assumes will drive the separation of powers. Power might explain their motives, but
partisanship would not. And if power is the
point, constitutionalism prevails.

Dusting off The Federalist Papers
Thus, what would have been the constitutional response to Moore’s announcement
that Trump had displaced Reagan? Whether
House Republicans belong to the party of
Reagan or the party of Trump, they first
belong to the institution of Congress. They
do not answer to presidents; they are, on
the contrary, duty-bound constitutionally to
resist attempts to enlarge executive authority beyond its proper bounds. The political
theory of the Constitution assumes they will.
It consequently does not recognize political
party and arguably assumes its absence: in
other words, that institutional interests will
trump ideological ones.
Federalist No. 51 presumes this when it
assumes institutional loyalty: not merely
that each branch will defend itself but also
that individual members of each branch will
defend themselves. Institutional loyalty, on
this understanding, is not altruistic. The
“ambition” that “must be made to counteract
ambition,” according to Federalist No. 51, is
personal, and the ambition is the exercise of
power by political man. George W. Carey,
a frequent contributor to these pages, used
to illustrate the point in this way: suppose
a presidential candidate who, driven solely
by a private lust for the mansion at 1600
Pennsylvania Avenue, fleet of jets, and budget for state dinners, bargains his authority
to Congress in exchange for a mess of electoral support. That is difficult to imagine
because we take it for granted that power is
what motivates presidents: we hope for good
purposes, perhaps for ill, but power nonetheless. They consequently jealously guard the
office’s authority.

The same drive is supposed to motivate
Congress. Senators and representatives are
not presumed to want the job if not for
the power it confers. Madison, writing in
The Federalist at a time predating a capital
with imperial pretensions and a Congress
with material inducements, can imagine no
other. Perhaps we can. Glamor attaches to
the national government, at least to elective
or high appointive office under it. So does
remuneration—if not for the job itself, then
for the career options that follow.
The supreme irony of congressional abdication is that Congress’s glamor derives from
the aura of power, which can be maintained
only by surrendering its substance. In the
pursuit of reelection, members have divested
themselves of the authority that makes
reelection worthwhile. They have delegated
broad swaths of it to the executive in ways
that maintain what we might call Government by Press Release: the ability to proclaim
broad goals while carping about the specific
exercises of authority they require. In other
cases, members of Congress conclude that
their political success is aligned with that of
a president of their party, such that marching
in lockstep behind his authority and agenda
serves their mutual interests. The permanent
campaign for the congressional majority,
similarly, entails either capitulation to the
president or obstruction of him, depending
on the partisan circumstances.
The consequent question is what good
either reelection or the majority are since
they do not occasion the exercise of power.
More charitably, the common assumption is that Congress does not stand up
for itself because it is burdened with a
collective-action problem by which no individual will incur the concentrated costs of
defending Congress because the benefits of
doing so are diffuse. But any body of any
size faces the same problem, and as late as
1887 Woodrow Wilson was complaining
of decades of congressional ascendancy in
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American politics, collective-action dilemmas notwithstanding. As Jeffrey K. Tulis
has noted, the collective-action explanation
cannot account for these long stretches of
congressional dominance.
The unique situation in which Republicans now find themselves—of Trump’s party
yet, on substantial issues, opposing him—
clarifies these issues. They can restore the
operation of the power motive in legislative
politics. Defending their preferences against
a president of their own party requires making a case for institutional propriety in addition to policy. If the question is simply the
latter, Trump, with his demagogic tendencies, will have the upper hand. A clarifying
conversation first needs to occur about the
proper division of constitutional labor.

The dangers of “presentism”
Such a conversation demands a capacity to
articulate why an understanding of constitutionalism, starting with the separation
of powers, matters. In Federalist No. 47,
Madison strikingly calls the combination
of powers “the very definition of tyranny,”
apparently regardless of how the powers are
exercised. He is influenced by Montesquieu’s
understanding that “political liberty in a
citizen is that tranquility of spirit which
comes from the opinion each one has of his
security.” In a regime of blended powers, in
which a single person or body wields the
actuality or potential of arbitrary authority, no one can be confident of his security
because no one can be sure what the sovereign will do next. For President Trump to be
the citizens’ “voice” in a regime of functionally combined authorities would so empower
him. Even his benevolent exercise of them
would disrupt the tranquility of a thoughtful citizen. (Tranquility is one condition for
investment, among other things. It is not too
far a stretch to wonder whether an individu38
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al’s willingness to invest in a business might
be affected by the knowledge that a single
authority, acting through the person of the
president, can—without any balancing
authority—exert pressure that determines
where it locates its manufacturing.)
The concentration of powers in a single
voice also presumes the desirability, not to
say possibility, of a unified national will in
a nation of 319 million people. Congress,
because of its multiplicity and its necessary
parochialism, is better positioned institutionally to register the subtlety and variety
of views in a diverse and extensive republic.
Trump’s voice, like that of any president, is
necessarily binary, operating on behalf of
those who agree with him. Those who do not
agree are on the outs, often for the fullness of
a four-year term. Congress, by contrast, is far
abler to represent the multifarious spectrum
of American political beliefs.
The legislative branch is more sedate and
deliberate in decision making than the executive as well. It is designed to be. Bicameralism requires two proverbial keys to launch
a missile. Initially, Madison reminds us, the
House and Senate were differently constituted to complicate combinations; even now,
their distinct cultures make cooperation at
least somewhat more challenging than it
would otherwise be. The legislative process
entails compromise and consensus. It takes
time, which enables passions to dissipate
and reason to take hold. The Senate plays
an especially important role in ensuring that
the “cool and deliberate sense of the community . . . ultimately prevail[s]” rather than
the impulsive rule of “irregular passion[s].”
Congressional primacy is, in this sense,
the appropriate vehicle for republican government, for the deliberate self-rule of political
man. Congress is a forum in which individuals cannot demand all they want: to get some,
they must give some. It is a place where, as
Tocqueville understood, private and public
goods converge, where personal participation
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in the public good is meaningful because
both are maintained. The personal is not
wholly absorbed in the political, but neither
is the public wholly subsumed in the selfish.
It is not this way in presidential politics.
To the limited extent to which presidents
can claim to speak for the people, it is the
people as a mass movement and homogeneous force, not as individuals maintaining their distinct identities and ambitions.
When combined with a personality cult,
wholesale presidentialism entails an abdication of the individual to a parental figure
whose locutions have emulated his predecessor’s obsessive use of the first-person
singular: “I am the only one who can make
America great again!” “I alone can fix it.” “I
am your voice.”
In the person of a president, as in the
teeth of populist movements, decisions can
be made on impulse. This is true of any president, but especially of a populist one. (That
Trump insists on maintaining his tweeting habit—using his personal account for,
among other purposes, taunting his media
critics—suggests impulsivity is a personality
trait he has yet to tame.) Presidential decisions are, in a sense, antipolitical: the work of
a single, undifferentiated “voice,” in Trump’s
formulation. There is no need for conversation or trade-offs.
Legislative primacy as part of a system of
separated powers contributes to another, and
related, conservative goal: the diffusion of
power. It prevents a single authority, in this
case the president, from either channeling or
acting on mere will. This is only aggravated
by the phenomenon of a president operating
as a tribune of the people and concentrating
the general will into a singularity. A president
acting alone is powerful enough; a president
powered by a public will for which he alone
alleges the moral authority to speak is too
much power to concentrate on any one head.
Trump seems determined to stoke public
passions. Federalist No. 71, by contrast, says

this of presidents: “When occasions present
themselves, in which the interests of the
people are at variance with their inclinations,
it is the duty of the persons whom they have
appointed, to be the guardians of those interests; to withstand the temporary delusion, in
order to give them time and opportunity for
more cool and sedate reflection.” Trump’s
apparent unwillingness to play this part
makes the Senate’s cooling function all the
more important.
Constitutionalism matters for other reasons that should appeal to conservatism to the
extent it actually aspires to conserve. The constitutional regime is the work of generations.
A growing body of literature, much of it leaning libertarian, holds that the Constitution
is binding because it is good for us here and
now. Madison had warned of “the hazards
and difficulties incident to [constitutional]
experiments, and of the great imprudence
of unnecessarily multiplying them,” but on
contemporary libertarian accounts, constitutional experiments are an eternal recurrence.
Randy Barnett, for example, argues that laws
can “bind in conscience” only to the extent
that they can be certified to be just.
Conservatism is incidental to these
accounts, or rather coincidental. It is pure
happenstance that the thing that is good for
us today existed in the past and therefore
ought to be conserved. If the good Constitution or just laws did not originate behind
us, we would be compelled to scan the
horizon in search of them. On this model,
progressivism might easily be exchanged for
conservatism; nothing morally commends
the one over the other. Better put, the model
is neither, for conservatism locates substantive value in custom, while progressivism’s
method is inherently focused on the future.
The libertarian method might more aptly
be described not as conservatism or as progressivism but rather as presentism, and it
will not succeed as a brief for constitutional
obligation. If the terms of the conversation
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are what works today, Americans will reasonably ask why a 230-year-old document
should inhibit their contemporary policy
preferences. If, they will wonder, the Constitution straitjackets us—inhibiting, for
instance, the immediate accomplishment
of the Trump agenda—and if the criterion
of wisdom is what suits us today, why not
unshackle ourselves? There are current and
self-interested reasons not to, of course:
immediate and impulsive self-government
often does not serve the public’s own good.
Still, an argument rooted in the present is
necessarily hobbled in justifying a document
written so distantly in the past.
By contrast, conservatism on the model
theorized by Edmund Burke and restored to
the American mind by the likes of Russell
Kirk and William F. Buckley can explain
that obligation. It accords moral value to
conservation. That is partly because conservatism, recognizing the limits of human
reason, prefers concrete experience—Burke’s
“collected reason of ages”—to instant and
abstract reflection. It is, in this sense, better
for us now to pay due respect to the past.
But, more important, conservatism regards
custom as authoritative because society is, as
Burke said, a contract between the dead, the
living, and those to be born. Burke conceived
of liberties as an “entailed inheritance,” a
metaphor that “furnishes a sure principle of
conservation, and a sure principle of transmission; without at all excluding a principle
of improvement.”
The Framers, to be sure, were not
Burkeans. But neither were they presentists.
An American myth, a sort of ignoble lie,
holds that our regime sprang forth from
Philadelphia in the manner in which Burke
satirized the revolutionary French Constitution: “ready made and ready armed, mature
in its birth, a perfect goddess of wisdom and
of war, hammered by our blacksmith midwives out of the brain of Jupiter himself.” In
fact, the American Constitution contains
40
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few devices that are not traceable to earlier
colonial forms. “Experience must be our only
guide,” John Dickinson had said at Philadelphia. “Reason may mislead us.” In that vein,
while Hamilton speaks in Federalist No. 1 of
forming a government based on “reflection
and choice,” that reference is to the process
of ratification, not the crafting of the regime
itself. With respect to the latter, in Federalist
No. 15, Hamilton calls experience “that best
oracle of wisdom,” whereas Madison, in Federalist No. 52, urges his readers to “consult
experience, the guide that ought always to be
followed whenever it can be found.”
Similarly, when Jefferson absurdly
proposed that no law endure longer than
nineteen years, which his demographic
tables told him was the average span of a
generation, Madison responded that while
it was true the earth belonged to the living,
“the improvements made by the dead form a
charge against the living who take the benefit of them. This charge can no otherwise
be satisfied than by executing the will of the
dead accompanying the improvements.” The
Framers so understood themselves. James
Wilson thus cautioned the Philadelphia Convention that it was “providing a Constitution
for future generations, and not merely for
the peculiar circumstances of the moment.”
(Wilson, protesting the colonial authority
of Parliament in 1774, had similarly spoken
intergenerationally in proclaiming that the
Americans would, rather than surrendering
their rights, “leave our posterity as free as our
ancestors left us.”)
Among the striking facts of Trump’s victory is his wholesale routing of the conservative elite, virtually all of which was arrayed
against him. One reason may have been that
the elite spoke substantially in policy positions, which, being transient by nature, are
vulnerable to capture. The moral obligation
of intergenerationality, the philosophical
core of conservative argument, offers more
enduring and binding value. Yet conserva-
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tives are less accustomed recently to making
this case in conserving terms.
Congressional Republicans, or at least
their leadership, seem aware of the moral
importance of intergenerationality. Speaker
Ryan admonished candidate Trump that he
had “inherited” the party of Lincoln and
Reagan. Trump, however, replied, via Twitter, in terms that suggested an awareness
only of the now: “Wrong, I didn’t inherit it,
I won it with millions of voters!” That all-isnow mentality cannot be true of a political
party that has existed for more than 160
years. If the Republican Party belongs to
Trump in the same manner as a Midtown
high-rise, can he demolish it? Would it be
his prerogative to remodel it by swapping out
its fundamental principles while retaining its
brand name? The Burkean answer is that
he cannot: debts are owed, to Lincoln, to
Coolidge, to Taft, to Dirksen, to Goldwater,
to Reagan, and, yes, in time, to Trump—but
also to future generations to whom the work
of those statesmen must be transmitted.
If this is true of a party, it is far truer
of a constitution. The constitutional inheritance is not merely a gift to be expended
or consumed; it is a responsibility to be
stewarded. This sense of intergenerational
obligation—debts to the past and future—is
the most solid and powerful grounding for
originalism and respect for constitutional
form. In his introduction to the Liberty
Fund edition of Burke’s Reflections, Francis
Canavan, noting Hume’s observation that
“human society is in perpetual flux,” writes:
“In this everlasting continuity, which secures
that the human race shall never be wholly
old or wholly new, lies the guarantee for the
existence of civilization.” We, too, stand on
a continuum with our founders, as they did
with their ancestors. We are free to modify
their work, to be sure, but should do so modestly and reverently. We owe this both to
those from whom we inherited it and those
to whom we will pass it down.

Our Fourth of July rhetoric notwithstanding, Americans are a more naturally
conserving than a revolutionary people.
Patriotism is that: it is not a celebration of
contemporary interest or of a future to be
conquered. It is an essentially backwardlooking virtue, one rooted in shared history.
Our legendary, critics claim excessive, reverence for the Constitution arises largely from
a sense of obligation and deference to custom, combined with a duty to generations
to come, not from an immediate appreciation of constitutional excellence. An appeal
to that sense can persuade. But the appeal
must be made.

Will Congress exert its prerogatives?
Congressional Republicans must therefore
argue that policymaking is a prerogative
belonging to them. They are in no position to
ace Trump out. The regime has passed pure
congressional supremacy by. Madison, assenting to the constitutionality of the national
bank whose legitimacy he once bitterly
opposed, said enduring practice ratified by
the people acting through all three branches
of government could settle—he seems really
to have meant “alter”—constitutional meaning. This need not scandalize; it is no more
than Burkean prescription, the idea that
long possession creates a rightful title. It is
constitutionalism as a heavy anchor in deep
water, not actually tethered to the bottom but
exerting sufficient drag that any motion is
imperceptibly slow. The motion in the direction of the presidency is now undeniable. A
regime in which the president is at least an
equal partner in policymaking is here to stay.
But that means Congress has at least an equal
place to claim as well, in addition to some
authorities—taxation, declaring war, appropriating funds—that are clearly its own.
If the vagueness of Trump’s policy positions provides an opening for Congress to fill
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in the details, so does the unconservatism of
many of the positions he has specified. There
are voices of constitutional independence
in both chambers: Ben Sasse in the Senate,
Justin Amash in the House. Ryan may be
another: he has, for example, championed
Medicare reform. The president’s apologists
say that, given that Trump was not elected
on this issue, it should not be pressed. Commentator Ann Coulter, for one, suggested
that if Ryan wants to reform Medicare, he
should run for the White House. This is
exactly why Ryan should press the issue, if
only as a matter of constitutional instruction. Trump can veto a Medicare bill. He has
that power, and was elected to wield it. Let it
be seen that constitutional conflict will not
sink the republic. It may help resurrect it.
There will also be tests where members
of Congress do agree with the president.
F. H. Buckley, a legal scholar and Trump
supporter, proposed that President Trump’s
Department of Education emulate President
Obama’s in using “Dear Colleague” letters,
for instance. The Obama Education Department used these to push its diversity agenda;
Buckley argues that the Trump administration should use them to push viewpoint
diversity. Yet as Peter Lawler has observed, if
administrative imposition is constitutionally
flawed in one case, as congressional Republicans correctly argued it was, it is flawed in
the other. Here, too, Congress must stand
for its prerogatives.
The great question pertains less to the
Sasses and Amashes, or to the Ryans, than
to those who disagree with Trump on policy
but have not yet articulated a constitutional
vision of Congress’s role. This moment is
their test. If Congress is prostrate now,
Republicans will have no claim to constitutionalism. Nor would they have any title
to authority, for their only claim to hold
it would be to have emptied it of content.
Voters would be entitled to inquire into their
motives. Why would an otherwise success42
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ful person expose himself to the indignities
and costs of campaigning, interrupt a career
that might otherwise have been lucrative and
often already was, bear separation from family and the other burdens of office, merely
to serve as a handmaiden to presidents or,
at best, a safety brake on their behavior?
The former smacks of the hangers-on at a
medieval court. It was the sort of behavior
that instantaneously normalized Trump, as
in then-RNC chair Reince Priebus’s declaration to ABC’s George Stephanopoulos that
a Trump victory would not split the party
because “winning is the antidote to a lot of
things.”
By reputation, Ryan and his Senate counterpart, Mitch McConnell, are not courtiers.
Between their Reaganism and Trump’s
Trumpism probably lies a new approach to
conservative policy. But conservatism must
ultimately be about Madisonianism. If so,
the question is how self-conscious they are
about what conservatism aspires to conserve.
The questions confronting conservatism
demand a return to first constitutional
principles, and it falls to these congressional
leaders to articulate them. That makes this
the conservative constitutional moment.
Will constitutional conversation be
compelling politically? Will the voters care
whether a policy is of Congress born, so
long as its substance is to their liking? If not,
Madison might wonder of the Americans in
2016 what he did of the ancient Greeks in
Federalist No. 38: Why would a people so
jealous of their liberty be driven to “consider
one illustrious citizen [Solon or Lycurgus]
as a more eligible depository of the fortunes
of themselves and their posterity, than a
select body of citizens, from whose common
deliberations more wisdom, as well as more
safety, might have been expected?” Trump’s
supporters claimed they wanted constitutional restoration. This is their constitutional
moment too.
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